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Latin America has regained attractiveness for foreign direct investment.
However, it is still uncertain whether the recent boom of capital inflows is
sustainable, and which countries are well prepared to benefit from the current
trend towards globalized production. Economic policies pursued by Latin
American governments are shown to be of overriding importance for explaining
why the region as a whole lost ground vis-a-vis Asian competitors for foreign
direct investment, and why some Latin American economies were more
successful than others in restoring their locational attractiveness.
JEL classification: F 21I. Introduction*
Latin America experienced a boom of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the early
1990s. FDI inflows nearly tripled as compared to the 1980s (Figure 1).
Nonetheless, it is still uncertain whether Latin America has restored its
attractiveness for foreign risk capital in a sustainable way, and which countries in
this region are well prepared to participate successfully in the current trend
towards globalized production. The prospects to succeed in this respect are
closely related to economic policies pursued by Latin American governments.
We proceed in the following steps in order to substantiate these contentions.
First, we argue that access to FDI is critically important for Latin America to
become more integrated into the international division of labor. Second, we
portray Latin America's position in the worldwide competition for FDI, and
identify diverging trends between major economies within the region. Third, we
analyze structural changes in the composition of FDI and overall capital inflows.
Fourth, we draw the link between the significance and structure of capital inflows
on the one hand and economic policies pursued by Latin American governments
on the other hand. Finally, we derive some policy conclusions from the
experience of those countries which were most successful in becoming involved
in corporate globalization strategies.
Paper prepared for the conference "The Transformation of Latin America" in Bogota,
March 27-28, 1996. I would like to thank the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft for
financial support. Thanks are also due to the German Embassy in Colombia, and especially
to Markus Baumanns, for most efficient support, stimulating discussions, and an impressing
hospitality.Figure 1 - FDI Flows to Latin America, 1980-1994 (annual averages)




1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94
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II. The Significance of Foreign Direct Investment in the Era of
Globalization
The world economy has witnessed a surge in FDI flows during the last decade or
so. Global flows in 1994 exceeded flows in 1980 by a factor of 4.3 LIMF a]. The
fact that FDI did not only increase relative to world output, but also grew three to
four times faster than international trade represents the clearest indication of the
trend towards globalized production patterns [Nunnenkamp et al. 1994].
Globalization means an advancing division of labor at a worldwide scale. This
process is driven by fiercer competition on international goods and capital
markets. New competitors for foreign capital include the transition economies in
Central and Eastern Europe, as well as Asian developing countries (DCs) which
have opened up towards world capital markets. At the same time, the
microelectronic revolution has resulted in declining information and transaction
costs, which in turn have enhanced the international mobility of capital and thetransfer of technology. All this has rendered easier the fragmentation of
production processes and the relocation of production to countries offering the
relevant comparative cost advantages.
The ways in which various economies are integrated into corporate globalization
strategies are adapted to country-specific factor endowments and specialization
profiles [Gundlach and Nunnenkamp 1996]. Factor endowments typically
prevailing in DCs have as a consequence that most of these countries play a
marginal role in the generation of technological innovations; few DC companies
have become part of technologically motivated business cooperation across
national boundaries, e.g. through strategic alliances. It is the application of
internationally available technologies which matters most for inducing catching-
up processes in DCs. Besides international trade in capital goods and traditional
forms of non-equity arrangements for technology transfers (e.g., licensing), FDI
represents an important means to gain access to internationally available
technologies. It follows that DCs with a relatively high attractiveness for FDI are
most likely to benefit from globalization and to succeed in catching up with
income levels in industrialized economies.
III. Latin America's Position in International Competition for FDI
As a matter of fact, various DCs have become involved in the process of globali-
zation. All DCs taken together attracted nearly a third of global FDI flows in
1991-1993. A DC share of 39 percent has been reported for 1994, which was
close to twice the average figure in 1980-1990 [UNCTAD 1995a; 1995b]. If, as
many observers argue, starting conditions were most favorable for relatively ad-
vanced DCs, Latin America should have been the first candidate to benefit from
globalization. In 1980, the average per-capita income of this region exceeded that
of Asian DCs nearly sixfold [UNCTAD a]. The share of agriculture in Latin
America's GDP was below 10 percent at that time already (Asian DCs: 25 per-cent). Manufacturing, which is the focus of corporate globalization strategies,
accounted for nearly a quarter of GDP in Latin America; this share was com-
parable to industrialized countries such as France and the United States. Most
importantly, Latin America had traditionally been a preferred host region for FDI;
its share in FDI flows to all DCs was close to 70 percent in 1980 [IMF a].
Yet, in contrast to East and Southeast Asia, Latin America largely failed in the
1980s to grasp the opportunities involved in globalization. The region's share in
worldwide manufacturing value added fell from 5.9 to 4.8 percent in 1983-1993,
while the share of East and Southeast Asian DCs doubled from 2.8 to 5.6 percent
(unpublished UNIDO database).
1 At the same time, the focus of foreign investors
shifted from Latin America to Asia. The latter region received nearly 60 percent
of FDI flows to all DCs in 1994. Latin America's share declined significantly
(Figure 1). This decline was not restricted to the "lost decade" of the 1980s; it
continued in the early 1990s, although absolute FDI inflows increased
substantially.
The regional pattern of FDI inflows obscures remarkable differences between
individual Latin American economies.
2 Figure 2 shows that it was mainly Brazil
which lost attractiveness as an investment location. Traditionally by far the most
1 The discrepancy is even more obvious when calculating shares in manufacturing value
added of all DCs. In 1983-1993, the share of Latin America dropped from 44.2 to 28.6
, percent; East and Southeast Asian DCs recorded a rise from 21 to 33 percent.
2 For a recent and comprehensive collection of data on FDI in Latin America, see IDB and
IRELA [1996].Figure 2 - FDI Rows to Major Latin American Countries, 1980-1994 (percent of total












































Source: IMF [a]; UNCTAD [1995c].important recipient of FDI inflows in the region, its share dwindled to about 12
percent in 1990-1994. Brazil was not only surpassed by Mexico, but recently also
by Argentina. Argentina's share in Latin American FDI inflows tripled to more
than 23 percent in 1990-1994, which, was largely due to FDI in the context of
privatization (see below). FDI shares of Chile, Colombia and Venezuela
fluctuated over time. In the latter country, privatization of state-owned enterprises
resulted in exceptionally high FDI inflows in 1991 [UNCTAD 1995c] . Colombia
attracted up to one quarter of all Latin American FDI inflows in the mid-1980s,
when flows to much of the debt-ridden region were at a low ebb. The country
could not maintain this share when major debtor countries began to tackle their
economic problems and regained competitiveness. Debt conversions accounted
for much of the particularly high FDI flows to Chile in the late 1980s. Controlling
for this distinct factor, Chile's attractiveness for FDI appears to be on a rising
trend. In 1990-1994, average annual FDI inflows per capita of population
amounted to US$ 65; in per-capita terms, Chile ranked second (behind Argentina
with US$ 96) among the Latin American economies considered in Figure 2.
The comparison of per-capita FDI inflows between Latin American economies
also reveals that the frequently noted concentration of FDI on a few major host
countries [see, e.g., UNCTAD 1995c: 69] gives a misleading impression as to the
participation of smaller economies in globalization. True, the six countries
considered in Figure 2 persistently absorbed more than 85 percent of total FDI
flows to Latin America. However, the high concentration of absolute flows is
mainly due to a large country bias. In per-capita terms, various small countries
proved more attractive for FDI than larger countries [see also IDB and IRELA
1996: 31]. Within a sample of 18 Latin American economies, the three smallest
countries (in terms of population in 1992) were indeed among the best performers
in attracting foreign investors:- Per-capita FDI inflows of Trinidad and Tobago in 1990-1994 (US$ 216) were
more than twice the figure for Argentina.
- In the same period, Costa Rica received higher per-capita inflows than Mexico
(US$ 54). Similar to Chile, per-capita inflows increased nearly threefold in
Costa Rica from an annual average of US$ 22 in 1980-1984 to more than
US$60 in 1990-1994.
- Jamaica experienced a dramatic change from slightly negative FDI flows in
1980-1984 to per-capita inflows of US$51 (annual average) in 1990-1994,
thereby approaching the figure for Mexico.
On the other hand, the attractiveness of some relatively small countries remained
fairly poor. For instance, per-capita FDI inflows in 1990-1994 were even below
the depressed level of US$ 11 for Brazil in Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala and
Honduras. It is thus not surprising that a simple correlation between per-capita
inflows and population size, calculated for the sample of 18 Latin American
economies, turned out to be insignificant.
3
IV. Structural Features of FDI Inflows and Possible Implications
FDI related to privatization of state-owned enterprises and the conversion of
foreign debt into equity finance played a significant role in several Latin
American economies.
4 In 1990-1991, FDI in the context of privatization
accounted for about 30 percent of total FDI flows to Latin America. This share
declined to 7 percent in 1993.
3 This applies to both the early 1980s and early 1990s. By contrast, per-capita FDI inflows
were correlated in a significantly positive way with per-capita income of recipient countries
in both periods.
4 The subsequent data are from UNCTAD [1995c]; on the role of privatization and debt
conversion with regard to FDI in Latin America, see also IDB and IRELA f 1996].The significance of privatization and debt conversion in overall FDI differed
remarkably between individual countries. Bolivia appears to represent an extreme
case (although data on the composition of FDI inflows are highly fragmentary for
this
: country): FDI inflows were completely due to privatization or debt
conversion in those years for which a breakdown of FDI data is available; FDI
flows not related to either privatization or debt conversion (i.e., "regular" FDI)
turned out to be negative. Argentina comes closest to Bolivia; privatization and
debt conversion accounted for nearly 80 percent of total FDI inflows in 1988-
1993 (Figure 3). Privatization was of overriding importance in Peru. Likewise,
"regular" FDI played a minor role in Venezuela. In sharp contrast, special factors
were of marginal importance in Mexico, and particularly in Colombia.
5
These differences may have important implications for the sectoral structure and
sustainability of FDI. As concerns the sectoral structure of FDI, especially
privatization may result in significant changes. Peru provides a case in point. FDI
inflows of US$ 2 billion related to the privatization of the Peruvian
telecommunications sector in 1994 represented about 60 percent of total FDI
inflows in 1988-1994 [UNCTAD 1995c]. Although individual projects have
typically less weight than in this extreme Peruvian example, privatization of
service activities figured prominently also in other Latin American economies.
6
5 Brazil and Chile, which both reported significant FDI from debt conversion, rank in a
medium position with regard to the share of "regular" FDI.
6 For instance, significant FDI inflows resulted from the privatization of telecommunications
in Mexico and Venezuela. In Argentina, foreign investors could participate on equal basis
vis-a-vis national investors in the privatization of the railroad system, the national
communications enterprise (ENTEL), radio and TV broadcasting companies, the national
airline (Aereolineas Argentinas), and other public services (e.g., gas, electricity, and postal
services) [UNCTAD 1994J.Figure 3•- Contribution of Privatization and Debt Conversion to Total FDI Flows to
Selected Latin American Countries, 1988-1993
percent
100.-r
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As a matter of fact, the tertiary sector has absorbed a rising share of total FDI
flows to major Latin American countries (Table I).
7 This trend is also to be
observed in countries such as Brazil where privatization did not play a major role.
7 The assessment of the sectoral composition of FDI flows suffers from serious data
constraints. Roughly comparable OECD statistics are available only for Argentina, Brazil
and Mexico. Even for these three countries, the statistical information is not fully
comparable because of differences in terms of coverage at the industry level, the
classification of industries, and reporting periods. According to data provided by IDB and
IRELA [1996], the service sectors have experienced the most dynamic growth in FDI
inflows in many Latin American countries.10
Table 1 - Sectoral Structure of FDI Flows to Argentina, Brazil and Mexico (percent
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Source: OECD [1994; 1995].
The available data actually reveal that service activities account for a larger FDI
share in Latin America than in Asian DCs.
8 FDI in finance, insurance and
business services appears to have played a particularly important role within the
tertiary sector of Argentina and Mexico. FDI in these areas should help the
recipient countries to gain locational attractiveness in the secondary sector as
8 According to OECD [1994], the tertiary sector accounted for roughly one third of total
FDI flows to South Korea and Taiwan in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In the case of
Thailand, the FDI share of service activities (51 percent) was comparable with the figures
for Argentina and Mexico. Similar to major Latin American countries, the significance of
the tertiary sector in total FDI inflows increased over time in Taiwan and Thailand (but not
in South Korea).11
well, considering that globalized production and marketing, strategies are,
supported by an adequate provision of business related services (including
financing, transport and communication).
FDI in the secondary sector of major Latin American economies has traditionally
been concentrated on relatively sophisticated manufacturing activities. Chemicals
and motor vehicles figure most prominently in this respect. The structure of FDI
at the industry level is more balanced in Asian DCs. In South Korea, for example,
the manufacturing of mechanical and electrical equipment accounted for
significant shares of total FDI inflows in addition to chemicals and motor vehicles
[OECD 1994]. Especially the important contribution of electrical equipment to
FDI flows to Asian DCs suggests that these countries became involved in
globalization through exploiting their comparative advantages. Table 1 also
reveals that Brazil's attractiveness for FDI is most seriously impaired in
manufacturing. Industries which traditionally absorbed the bulk of FDI in the
secondary sector suffered from considerable FDI outflows in the early 1990s.
This refers particularly to the manufacturing of motor vehicles.
The next question concerns the sustainability of FDI inflows. One might argue
that sustainability is at risk particularly for countries in which FDI due to special
factors dominated "regular" FDI. Privatization and debt conversions may be
regarded as distinct events with an immediate impact on FDI flows, which cannot
be sustained once the potential for privatization and debt conversion is exhausted.
It is indeed beyond serious doubt that exceptionally high peaks in overall FDI
inflows may result from temporary factors. The broad-based privatization
program of Argentina in the early 1990s and the aforementioned privatization of
the Peruvian telecommunications sector in 1994 may provide cases in point.
However, FDI flows involved in privatization and debt conversion are not
necessarily one-off events. In many cases, privatization contracts have specified12
further capital commitments to be undertaken subsequent to the original purchase,
sometimes stretching over years, and the change in ownership has often been
associated with significant additional investment in the rationalization and
modernization of privatized firms [UNCTAD 1995c: 75; IDB and IRELA 1996:
53]. Likewise, reinvested earnings of firms which foreign investors acquired
through privatization and debt conversion may result in additional FDI flows far
beyond the initial transaction. Furthermore, privatization and debt reduction
programs may improve the climate for FDI in indirect ways. Especially
privatization signals the government's seriousness on economic reform and
reduces uncertainty about the sustainability of the reform process. Privatization is
also instrumental to competition on a level playing field. It provides governments
with better chances to impose hard budget constraints on enterprises, notably to
stop the subsidization of inefficient state-owned firms. This would ease the fiscal
situation and contribute to macroeconomic stability, which in turn provides better
prospects to attract FDI. The hardening of budget constraints also removes
distortions in the allocation of productive resources. As a result, new FDI may be
induced in sectors which suffered from insufficient access to capital and labor
markets in the past.
Especially the indirect effects of privatization and debt conversion on FDI flows
are almost impossible to quantify. Tentative evidence for the seven Latin
American economies considered in Figure 3 points to a rather ambiguous relation
between the significance of special factors and longer-term FDI trends. The
growth of "regular" FDI was lowest in Argentina and Brazil, although the
significance of FDI from privatization differed remarkably between these two
countries.
9 By contrast, the highest growth of "regular" FDI was recorded by
9 Growth of "regular" FDI is measured by the ratio of "regular" FDI inflows in 1993 to
"regular" FDI inflows in 1988 (Chile: 1993 to 1989) [UNCTAD 1995cl.Bibliothek
to Instituts fur We!twirtsch@i^
Chile, for which the significance of special factors was comparable with Brazil.
Venezuela ranked second in terms of growth of "regular" FDI. At the same time,
the share of FDI from privatization and debt conversion was fairly high in this
country. One may thus conclude that all countries, irrespective of the significance
of special factors, face a similar challenge when it comes to sustaining longer-
term FDI growth.
Long-term FDI growth would also help to sustain overall capital inflows. FDI
proved relatively stable in Latin America recently, especially as compared with
the volatility of portfolio investment [Gundlach and Nunnenkamp 1996]. FDI
typically involves a lasting commitment to the recipient economy, and therefore
provides the best indicator on the integration of DCs into corporate globalization
strategies. Other types of capital inflows are not directly linked to globalization.
Portfolio equity flows, for example, may be transformed into productive
investment; but they are frequently of a rather speculative nature, and are easily
withdrawn if higher returns are offered elsewhere or risk perceptions change
abruptly [see also UNCTAD 1995b].")
It follows that the composition of overall capital inflows may provide relevant
insights on the sustainability of external financing and the prospects of becoming
involved in globalization. Table 2 reveals that the structure of capital inflows
differs significantly between Latin American economies:
- All countries reduced the significance of debt inflows, which clearly dominated
external financing until the early 1980s. However, the reduction was modest
for Brazil, whose reliance on debt inflows in 1993 was still fairly high by the
standards of both Latin America and DCs in other regions. Though to a lesser
1
0 The susceptibility of portfolio investment to transient financial shocks was witnessed by the
Mexican crisis of 1994/95. The previous boom was sharply interrupted in 1994, when
portfolio equity flows to Latin America came down to 42 percent of the 1993-figure.14
Table 2- Structure (
inflows)






































































































, excluding IMF loans. - b Excluding technical cooperation
Source: World Bank [1995a].
extent, the same applies to Argentina.
1
1
- Yet, Brazil and Argentina differ in an important respect. In the former country,
the shift was from debt to portfolio investment, whereas the contribution of
FDI to total capital inflows declined tremendously. Argentina relied far less on
portfolio investment and significantly more on FDI.
1
1 It may be noted that the significance of FDI related to debt conversion had little impact on
the degree to which the share of debt in external financing was reduced. As a matter of
fact, the share of debt remained relatively high in Argentina and Brazil, although debt
conversion figured most prominently in these two countries.15
- Mexico's financing structure of 1993 proved to be unsustainable only one year
later. The remarkable decline in the share of debt was completely offset by the
boom of portfolio investment in the early 1990s. The reliance on the latter was
exceptionally high by all standards. At the same time, the share of FDI in total
external financing of Mexico remained substantially below that of other DCs,
although nominal FDI flows to Mexico were 2.3 times higher in 1993 than in
1980 [World Bank 1995a].
- The structure of overall capital inflows suggests that the prospects to sustain
external financing are most favorable in Chile and Colombia.
1
2 Both countries
have drawn on portfolio equity flows to a limited extent. The shift was mainly
from debt to FDI. Moreover, as shown before, this shift was primarily due to
the increase of "regular" FDI, especially in Colombia. This may further help
sustainability.
From the discussion so far it appears that, among major Latin American
economies, Chile and Colombia were relatively successful in attracting foreign
investors in a way which supports the sustainability of external financing as a
whole. Moreover, the available evidence indicates that some smaller economies
such as Costa Rica also performed fairly well. In sharp contrast, Brazil
experienced a serious setback in participating in globalized production through
close international investment relations. The recent position of Argentina and
Mexico proved more ambiguous. As witnessed by the financial crisis of 1994/95,
an inherently unstable structure of external financing had emerged in Mexico in
the early 1990s. In the case of Argentina, it may be open to question whether FDI
1
2 Changes in the structure of external financing in Costa Rica have much in common with
Colombia. In both countries, net flows of long-term debt turned significantly negative. As a
result, FDI inflows exceeded total net resource inflows. Another similarity concerns the
emergence of grants as a relevant source of external finance.16
growth can be maintained in the longer run, when FDI related to debt conversion
and privatization is fading away.
V. The Role of Economic Policy
The different performance of Latin American economies in attracting FDI is
largely determined by economic policies pursued by the governments of these
countries. In order to substantiate this contention, three policy areas are
addressed in the following:
- the regulatory regime governing FDI,
- transaction cost-related impediments to a closer integration into corporate
globalization strategies, and
- major aspects of the overall policy environment.
1
3
As concerns the FDI regime, recent survey results point to far-reaching
liberalization of regulations in various Latin American economies [see also IDB
and IRELA 1996: 27]. According to an assessment by the ERT [1993a; 1993b],
the scope of remaining impediments to FDI (as of 1992) is low by international
standards, for example, in Argentina, Mexico, and Colombia.
1
4 Among the Latin
American countries analyzed by ERT, only Brazil is somewhat lagging behind.
Even for Brazil, however, FDI restrictions are not considered excessive after
considerable improvements in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Major findings of the ERT survey are corroborated by an evaluation of various
elements of the FDI regime in Latin America, as compared with Asian
1
3 A detailed evaluation of policies pursued in these areas is beyond the scope of this paper.
We focus on issues which appear to be of considerable relevance in the context of FDI and
globalization. This qualification refers particularly to the overall policy framework.
1
4 Chile is not included in the ERT reports. Argentina and Mexico are given credit for
extensive improvements in FDI conditions during 1987-1992.17
competitors for FDI (Table 3). On average, the regulatory regime turns out to be
more favorable to FDI in Latin America than in Asia. A notable exception
concerns investment protection (column 6), which is considered insufficient
especially in Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela. Brazil and Venezuela are relatively
restrictive in other respects as well.
1
5
As a result, the overall assessment is least favorable for these two Latin American
countries (column 7). Even for them, however, the regulatory FDI regime does
not constitute a considerable competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis major recipients
of FDI in Asia. Argentina, Chile and Peru are at the top of the ranking in Latin
America.
1
6 All in all, the FDI regime in Latin America appears to have converged
at a lower regulatory level. The remaining differences are probably too small to
account for the contrasting experience in attracting FDI.
Latin America compares less favorably with Asian DCs when it comes to
transaction cost-related barriers to FDI. As mentioned in Section II, globalization
has been supported by the general decline in transaction costs. It follows that
countries in which transaction cost-related barriers to FDI continue to be
relatively high are less likely to benefit from globalization. According to survey
results summarized in Table 4, it is in several respects that Latin America suffers
from competitive disadvantages in terms of transaction costs vis-a-vis the control
1
5 Compared with other locations in Latin America, it is regarded as difficult to acquire
control in a domestic company (Brazil; column 1), to employ foreign skills (both countries;
column 3), and to negotiate cross border ventures (both countries; column 5).
1
6 Colombia and Mexico rank in a medium position. Colombia scores below the Latin
American average with regard to the frequency of strategic alliances (column 4) and
government interference with negotiations on cross border ventures (column 5). The result
for Mexico is somewhat in conflict with the more favorable assessment by the ERT.18





































































































a Survey results are scaled from 0 (least favorable to FDI) to 10 (most favorable to FDI). The criteria
listed are as follows:
(1) Foreign investors may not acquire (0)/are free (10) to acquire control in a domestic company.
(2) Foreigners are not treated (0)/arc treated (10) equally to citizens in all respects.
(3) Immigration laws prevent (0)/do not prevent (10) your company from employing foreign skills.
(4) Strategic alliances are not common (0)/arc common (10) between domestic and foreign firms.
(5) Cross border ventures cannot be negotiated with foreign partners without government imposed
restraint (0)/can be negotiated freely (10).
(6) Investment protection schemes are not (0)/are available for most foreign partner countries (10).
(7) Average assessment according to criteria (l)-(6).
" Average for seven Latin American economies. —
 c Average for China, Hong Kong, India,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand.
Source: World Economic Forum [1995].
group of Asian DCs.
1
7 Most notably, Latin America appears to be lagging behind
Asian standards as concerns the development of technological infrastructure (row
11). This may represent a serious bottleneck to a closer integration into corporate
globalization strategies, considering that the transfer and application of
1
7 Latin America enjoys a significant competitive edge over Asian DCs in just one area,
namely access of foreign companies to local capital markets. This reduces financial
transaction costs for FDI projects that rely on local co-financing to a considerable extent.19

























































































































































a Survey results are scaled from 0 (least favorable to FDI) to 10 (most favorable to FDI). The criteria listed are
as follows:
(1) National culture is closed (0)/open (10) towards foreign cultures.
(2) Image of your country abroad is distorted (0)/reflecls reality accurately (10).
(3) State control of enterprises distorts (0)/does not distort (10) fair competition in your country.
(4) The government does not often communicate its intentions successfully (0)/is transparen
citizens (10).
(5) Bureaucracy hinders (0)/does not hinder (10) business development.
towards
(6) Improper practices (such as bribing or corruption) prevail (0)/do not prevail (10) in the public sphere.
(7) Lobbying by special interest groups distorts (0)/does not distort (10) government decision making
(8) Local capital markets are not accessible to foreign companies (0)/are equally accessible to domestic and
foreign companies (10).
(9) Distribution systems are generally inefficient (0)/efficient (10).
(10) Telecommunications infrastructure does not meet (0)/meets business requirements very well (10)
(11) Technologicalinfraslructure is developed slower (0)/faster (10) than in your competitor countries
(12) Average assessment according to criteria (1) - (11).
h Average for seven Latin American economics. —
 c Average for China, Hong Kong, India, I
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand.
ndonesia,
Source: World Economic Forum [1995],20
internationally available technologies depend on the availability of
complementary factors of production in the recipient country.
1
8 A similarly large
discrepancy between the two regions prevails with regard to transparency of
public decision making (row 4). Lack of transparency, which is considered most
serious in Mexico and Venezuela, obviously translates into higher information
and transaction costs. The same applies to bureaucratic interference with business
decisions (row 5) and the prevalence of corruption (row 6). Finally, higher
transaction costs may result from less advanced distribution and
telecommunications systems in Latin America (rows 9 and 10).
1
9
Taken as a whole, Table 4 indicates that Chile has been most successful in
reducing transaction costs, which helps to explain its favorable performance in
attracting FDI. Likewise, FDI flows to Argentina have probably been encouraged
by rather low transaction cost-related barriers to FDI. Nevertheless, the strikingly
different pattern of FDI flows to Latin American economies can be attributed only
partly to differences in transaction costs. For instance, transaction costs appear to
be of similar significance in Brazil and Colombia, while these two countries
recorded opposing trends in FDI inflows.
2
0
The impact of FDI regulations and transaction cost-related variables was
probably dominated by the overall policy environment prevailing in the host
countries of FDI. Major factors shaping the competitive position of DCs in
globalized production concern (i) macroeconomic stability, (ii) investment in




8 Technological infrastructure is considered deficient especially in Colombia, whereas Chile is
more advanced in this respect than the group of Asian DCs.
1
9 In both respects, Chile is again considered most competitive. Colombia and Venezuela
represent the taillights of the ranking in Table 4.
20 Moreover, Table 4 reveals higher transaction costs in Mexico than in Brazil, although
Mexico performed much better than Brazil in attracting FDI.
2
1 For a more detailed discussion, see Gundlach and Nunnenkamp [1996].21
Comparative evidence for these factors, as portrayed in Table 5, reveals why
Latin America as a whole has been less successful in attracting FDI than Asian
DCs, and why some Latin American economies are well ahead of their neighbors
in competing for FDI.
2
2



























a Annual average for 1980-1993
















from 0 (national protectionism prevents foreign
10 (national protectionism does
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services frombeing imported) to
not prevent foreign products and services from being
listed Latin
(except investment and schooling), Hong
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore
and investment), and Thailand.






Korea, Taiwan (except inflation
Source: World Bank [1995b]; Glen and Sumlinski [1995]; Gundlach [1995, Table
Al]; World Economic Forum [1995].
Macroeconomic stability, notably the absence of high and volatile rates of
inflation, is the first indicator of a business environment which is conducive to
2
2 An earlier assessment of economic policies in highly indebted Latin American countries
revealed "a nearly perfect correspondence between the degree of reform-mindedness and
the attractiveness ... for foreign capital" [Nunnenkamp 1993: 93; see also Nunnenkamp
1994J.22
becoming involved in corporate globalization strategies [see also Hiemenz,
Nunnenkamp et al. 1991]. High inflation reduces the informational content of
relative price changes, and results in higher investment risks and misallocation of
resources. In sharp contrast to Asia, which is well reputed for macroeconomic
stability, inflation was excessively high in various Latin American economies in
the past. Only Chile, Colombia and Costa Rica have a longer tradition of
preventing annual inflation rates from exceeding the 20 percent mark
considerably.
2
3 It is probably not just by pure coincidence that exactly these
countries were most successful in attracting FDI in a sustainable way. Mexico
and Argentina regained attractiveness precisely when comprehensive stabilization
programs were launched, whereas FDI dwindled in Brazil where excessive
inflation was not tackled until recently [see also IDB and IRELA 1996: 31-32].
A similar pattern prevails with respect to investment in physical and human
capital. This is not surprising: Investment can be expected to be higher in a stable
macroeconomic environment, which tends to contain investment risk in the longer
run. Gross fixed capital formation, in percent of GDP, has traditionally been high
in low-inflation Asia. The investment ratio of many Asian DCs rose further in the
early 1990s. Likewise, human capital formation (measured by average years of
schooling) is more advanced in Asia than in Latin America.
2
4 Consequently, the
former region had better prospects to participate in globalized production. A
qualified workforce, and high and rising investment ratios improved the host
2
3 Inflation was much more volatile in Venezuela. For annual rates of inflation in the Latin
American countries under consideration, see ECLAC [1995, Table A.3].
2
4 The discrepancy between the two regions becomes more pronounced when human capital
formation is measured by secondary school enrollment ratios in 1992. The World Bank
[1995b] reports an average enrollment ratio of 47 percent for seven Latin American
countries (no data available for Argentina), while the ratio was 55 percent for seven Asian
DCs (no data available for Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan). Data on average years of
schooling are drawn from Barro and Lee [1993], as reported in Gundlach [1995].23
countries' endowment with complementary factors of production, and encouraged
the diffusion and application of new technologies.
Compared with Asian DCs, "foreign investment has all too often substituted for,
rather than supplemented, the development of a domestic investor base" in Latin
America [The Economist 1995: 9]. Yet, the (physical and human) investment
record varies significantly between individual countries:
- The share of gross fixed capital formation in GDP was declining in Brazil, but
remained above the Latin American average. As concerns human capital
formation, however, Brazil was clearly lagging behind other Latin American
countries.
- Chile is again the top performer; rising physical capital formation resulted in
the highest investment ratio within the region, and the country ranked next to
Argentina in terms of human capital formation.
2
5
- The indicators of physical and human capital formation also suggest that Costa
Rica is relatively competitive in these respects. By contrast, the indicators are
in striking contrast with Colombia's favorable performance in attracting FDI.
- The evidence for the remaining sample countries is more ambiguous.
Argentina, Peru and Venezuela are above or very close to Asian standards in
terms of average years of schooling, while all three countries are characterized
by rather low and declining investment ratios.
2
6 Mexico's position is relatively
favorable with regard to the investment ratio, but fairly weak with regard to
schooling.
2
5 Secondary school enrollment in Chile (72 percent) was exceptionally high by Latin
American standards.
2
6 Human capital formation is considerably less advanced in Peru and Venezuela when
measured by secondary school enrollment ratios [World Bank 1995b].Finally, openness towards world markets may shape the prospects to attract FDI.
On analytical grounds, the relation between the trade regime and FDI is not
straightforward. On the one hand, FDI provides a means to jump over
protectionist fences. On the other hand, the theory of optimal timing of FDI
suggests that FDI follows trade and replaces exports, once foreign companies
have reached a certain market share in potential investment locations. In several
empirical studies, however, the correlation between trade and FDI turned out to
be significantly positive.
2
7 This supports the view that both trade and FDI flows
are driven by a common set of determinants.
The relevance of openness towards world markets is increasing under conditions
of globalized production. DCs which restrict imports of capital goods and trade in
intermediate and final goods are rather unlikely to become integrated into
international sourcing and marketing networks. Conversely, DCs which avoided
persistent discrimination against world market-oriented activities, such as various
Asian economies, have emerged as preferred FDI locations; this, in turn, has
contributed to sustained export growth [Agarwal et al. 1995].
As concerns Latin America, notable changes in the trade regime have taken place
in many countries. According to recent survey results, Latin America is indeed
considered more open, on average, than the control group of Asian DCs (Table
5). At the same time, the significance of protectionism continues to vary greatly
within the region. Venezuela and Brazil are perceived to be most restrictive in
this respect. By contrast, Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Peru are fairly open by
international standards. Chile in fact ranked fifth within a sample of 48
industrialized and developing countries analyzed by the World Economic Forum
[1995]. On the whole, the survey results on the significance of import protection
2
7 For a detailed evaluation, see Nunnenkamp et al. 11994: 82-88].25
in Latin America are in line with the proposition that relatively open economies
enjoy better prospects to regain attractiveness for FDI.
VI. Summary and Conclusions
Latin America has made considerable progress in restoring its attractiveness for
FDI. Nevertheless, the prospects to participate successfully in ongoing
globalization remain clouded by uncertainty in several respects. First of all, some
economies in the region have suffered from a serious setback in competing for
FDI. Brazil exemplifies the costs in terms of forgone FDI that arise from
persistent muddling-through, insufficient reform-mindedness, and lack of
government credibility. For other economies, the sustainability of FDI growth is
still at risk. This applies to countries such as Argentina, where the recent boom of
FDI was mainly due to special factors such as privatization and debt conversion.
Moreover, Mexico's financial crisis in 1994/95 testifies the susceptibility of
capital inflows to changing risk perceptions of foreign investors. Such changes
may occur abruptly once policy inconsistencies become obvious, for example, in
the context of exchange rate-based stabilization programs.
2
8
Domestic economic policy is of overriding importance for explaining why Latin
America as a whole has lost ground vis-a-vis Asian competitors for FDI, and why
some Latin American economies have been more successful than others in
restoring their locational attractiveness. DCs are no longer free to pursue
economic policies of their own liking in the era of globalized production. The
dismal experience of Brazil strongly suggests that policy constraints are binding
not only for small countries, but also for economies offering huge domestic
markets:
2
8 For a detailed account of the risks and inconsistencies entailed in Mexico's exchange rate-
based approach towards macroeconomic stabilization, see Langhammer and Schweickert
[1995].26
- Countries being reluctant to follow the worldwide trend towards liberalization
of FDI regulations run the risk of being delinked from corporate globalization
strategies.
- High transaction costs (e.g., resulting from government interference with
business decisions, lack of transparency, and inadequate infrastructure) tend to
discourage FDI inflows.
- Countries characterized by macroeconomic instability, low investment in
physical and human capital, and a restrictive trade regime are most likely to fail
in attracting FDI.
The general trend towards reform notwithstanding, significant differences persist
as to the extent to which Latin American economies have fulfilled the
prerequisites to becoming part of global sourcing and marketing networks. These
differences are clearly reflected in country-specific FDI developments. Countries
such as Chile which have made substantial progress in improving the policy
environment for FDI were most successful in attracting FDI in a sustainable way.
From this account, the current challenges and future risks concerning Latin
America's integration into globalized production are more or less obvious.
Most importantly, governments bear major responsibility for creating and
maintaining a policy environment that is conducive to FDI. Macroeconomic
stability is primarily a matter of government budget discipline. The rate of
investment depends on business taxation, government regulations and the
efficiency of public infrastructure. The amount of compulsory formal education
reflects the government's attitude towards the provision of public goods.
Openness towards world markets requires governments to resist the demand for
protection by special interest groups.
In other words, attractiveness for FDI critically depends on economic policies
pursued at the national level. This is not to deny that the recent revival of regional27
integration may provide an additional stimulus to FDI in Latin American
economies being part of integration schemes. The envisaged formation of
NAFTA encouraged FDI flows to Mexico at the beginning of the 1990s already.
However, regional integration per se is unlikely to enhance the locational
attractiveness of Latin American economies. The Mexican example rather
suggests that domestic reforms are a prerequisite to successful regional
integration. Hence, regional integration must not be regarded as a substitute for
improved investment conditions at the national level.
Latecomers in economic policy reform might face an uphill struggle against
competitors which are presently absorbing the bulk of FDI flowing to DCs.
However, the relevant question is whether any promising alternative to
macroeconomic stabilization, physical and human capital formation, and an open
trade regime exists. The Brazilian example clearly suggests a negative answer.
Furthermore, international competition for FDI is not a zero-sum game [Bergsman
and Lall 1995]. Hence, if a country such as Brazil were to restore its
attractiveness for foreign investors, additional FDI might be the result, rather than
Brazil having to divert FDI from other locations.
Yet, FDI inflows must not be considered a substitute for domestic capital
formation. While globalization tends to spur international capital mobility, there
are few examples of large and sustained net capital inflows even among the most
successful Asian DCs. Empirical evidence indeed suggests that countries are
essentially constrained by their own domestic savings [see also Feldstein 1995].
Consequently, Latin American countries have to raise more domestic savings in
order to ease constraints on physical and human capital formation, which in turn
would help to fully exploit the potential for FDI.28
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